急需两篇商业银行改革和不良资产的英文文章

附件二：**英文资料翻译　　英文资料一　　作者：richard podpiera　　题目：progress in china’s banking sector reform　　**银行业改革的进　　出处：imf wo**ng ** series no.93　　march 2006　　国际货币基金工作报告93号　　2006年3月　　英文资料二　　作者：doug pearce　　题目：reform of china's banks, burdened by bad loans, ** priority for **　　改革**银行不良贷款带来的负担,是**的要事　　出处：state banks in allocating credit to chinese state-owned enterpr**es vol. 71, pp. 533–59　　june 2005　　**股份制企业银行信用7卷，53-59页　　2005年6月　　i introduction　　th** wo**ng ** should not be reported as representing the views of the imf. the views expressed in th** wo**ng ** are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily represent those of the imf or imf policy. wo**ng **s describe research in progress by the author(s) and are publ**hed to elicit comments and to further debate. substantial effort has been devoted to reforming china’s banking system in recent years. the authorities recapitalized three large state-owned banks, introduced new governance　　structures, and brought in foreign strategic investors. however, it remains unclear the extent to which currently reported data reflect the true credit r**k in loan portfolios and whether lending dec**ions h**e started to be taken on a commercial bas**. we examine lending growth, credit pricing, and regional patterns in lending from 1997 through 2004 to look for evidence of changing beh**ior of the large state-owned commercial banks (scbs). we find that the scbs h**e slowed down credit expansion, but that the pricing of credit r**k remains undifferentiated and banks do not appear to take enterpr**e profitability into account when making lending dec**ions. controlling for several factors, we find that large scbs h**e continued to lose market share to other financial institutions in provinces with more profitable enterpr**es. the full impact of the most recent reforms will become clear only in several years, however, and these **sues should be rev**ited in future research.　　banking reforms are at the core of china’s strategy to improve the intermediation of its large private sector s**ings. reforms in the banking sector h**e been implemented over the last two decades in china, replacing the monobank system with a multilayered system that separates commercial lending and central banking functions. however, lending by stateowned commercial banks (scbs) has been inefficient and focused on state-owned enterpr**es, has brought a large burden of nonperforming loans, and has triggered several attempts to recapitalize and reform the banks. one important restructuring action came in 1999, when the ** transferred a substantial amount of nonperforming loans to asset.　　management companies at book value.2 the most recent major initiative to improve the functioning of the banking sector started in late 2003, when the ** decided to recapitalize two of the four major scbs and introduce changes in legal structure, corporate governance, and r**k management, with the goal of bringing in strategic investors and eventually l**ting the banks. th** effort has been partly motivated by the prospects of facing increased competition when, at the end of 2006 under the world trade organization agreement, the sector will be opened to foreign banks.　　th** ** focuses on reforms in the four scbs, which continue to be the major part of the banking system in china. at end-2004, the four scbs—the industrial and commercial bank of china (icbc), the bank of china (boc), the china construction bank (ccb), and the agricultural bank of china (abc)—accounted for almost 60 percent of banking system assets.3 we reviewed the progress in reform implementation and examined lending growth, credit pricing, and regional patterns in lending to look for evidence of changing beh**ior of the scbs. while the full impact of the most recent reforms will become clear only in several years’ time, we believe it ** useful to explore any changes in the beh**ior of scbs—in response to the long-term reform effort and as an initial reaction to the most recent reforms.　　several previous studies describe the reform effort and the inefficiency of the chinese stateowned banks.4 imf (2004 and 2005) provides an overview of the most recent reforms and barnett (2004) reviews the structure and recent developments in the banking sector. for a review of previous banking system reforms, since the mid-1990s, see karacadag (2003).　　duenwald and aziz (2003) explored the growth-financial-development nexus in china and concluded that, contrary to most cross-country studies, financial development (proxied by total bank lending) has not significantly boosted growth among china’s provinces. boyreau-debray and wei (2005) found that the correlation between investment and s**ings at the provincial level ** strong and increased in the 1990s when scbs were given more autonomy in allocating regional credit. th** suggests the ex**tence of large barriers to capital mobility, possibly in the form of noncommercially motivated interference in bank lending dec**ions.　　progress has been made on reforming the scbs, but more needs to be done to make banks more efficient. the two pilot reform banks, the boc and the ccb, h**e likely met the 2005 quantitative targets set in their restructuring plans. they h**e completed their financial restructuring, introduced new governance structures, and started improving r**k management and internal controls. the approval in 2005 of a reform plan for the largest bank in the system, the icbc, was an important step. furthermore, all three banks h**e recently introduced minority strategic investors. however, the last state commercial bank—the abc—still lacks a restructuring plan. remaking and modernizing the operations of these banks, increasing their commercial orientation, and establ**hing a strong credit culture are major undertakings that will inevitably take time to implement and to yield substantial benefits.　　the next two sections describe the progress in reforms of two large scbs that were chosen as a pilot for reforms (the boc and the ccb) as well as reforms in other banks. section iv then explores any impact the reforms h**e had on bank lending dec**ions, level of credit r**k, and credit r**k pricing. section iii concludes and outlines key areas for further reforms.　　ii reforms in two pilot banks　　the boc and the ccb were selected as pilot banks for the latest reform effort, which　　commenced in late 2003. in december 2003, the authorities announced the dec**ion to　　recapitalize these two banks with $45 billion from foreign exchange reserves and to develop a broader reform plan. these plans involved strengthening their corporate governance and r**k management, resolving non-performing loans (npls), using reputable external auditors to assess the true financial position of the banks, as well as enhancing external oversight of the banks’ operations. the authorities also set the goal of bringing in strategic investors and l**ting the banks’ shares.　　overall, good progress has been made in implementing the reform plans in the two pilot banks. financial restructuring of the boc and the ccb has been completed. both banks h**e likely met the 2005 quantitative targets, were incorporated as joint stock companies, introduced new corporate governance structures, h**e worked on changing r**k management and internal organization, brought strategic investors, and either were l**ted (ccb) or appear on track to do so in 2006 (boc). however, it will likely take time before the ongoing changes become fully effective.　　the boc and the ccb basically met two 2004 quantitative targets and likely met the firstfull set of quantitative targets for 2005 (table 1). there were only two quantitative targets set for 2004, the ratio of npls to total loans and capital adequacy. the completed financial restructuring, including the $45 billion capital injection and npl write-offs and sales, helped the two banks meet these targets.overall, 2004 performance and preliminary **rmation for 2005 suggest that the banks were on track to meeting the first full set of quantitative performance benchmarks at end-2005.　　first steps h**e been taken in corporate governance, internal organization, and r**k　　management reforms. both banks h**e been transformed into joint-stock companies—the bank of china limited and china construction bank corporation—and h**e put into place a new corporate governance structure with a shareholders’ meeting, board of directors, board of superv**ors, and top management operating according to newly adopted rules. the boc board of directors, for instance, now cons**t of 13 directors, of which 7 are non-executive directors, 3 are executive directors, and the remaining 3 are international senior financial experts serving as independent directors.7 both banks prepared, adopted, and started to implement development plans that deal with a number of operational areas, including internal organization and control, strategic development, and r**k management. however, important concerns about governance and internal controls remain. several scandals, including high-level corruption at the ccb and embezzlement at the boc, h**e been uncovered during the implementation of recent reforms. while these were related to events that occurred prior to the reforms, they highlight the need to implement improvements in internal control systems and governance. furthermore, while the formal corporate governance structure has changed substantially, the way business ** done may not h**e changed much just yet. for instance, recent reports argued that, in the ccb, the board was the nominal final dec**ion maker, but board members were not routinely involved in important dec**ions.8 separately, the implementation of reforms in r**k management only started, and it will certainly take some time before they are fully implemented throughout the relatively large organizations.　　both banks h**e introduced strategic investors with a minority ownership share.10 by　　offering an ownership stake, the banks generally expect to diversify the ownership structure, enhance their capital strength, take advantage of the partner’s management and technology expert**e, and launch joint operations in selected areas 20210311