求助英语翻译，高手进

刚看了两篇都是机器翻译的.bs之这里的billions我是按照亿来翻译的,因为有不同的解释,你可以参考其他的中文资料确定具体金额.cdo 是 collateralized debt obligations我翻译的是债务抵押债券new york (fortune)纽约(财富) -- it was the second week of october 2006.在进入2006年十月的第二个星期. william king, then j.p. morgan's chief of securitized products, was vacationing in rwanda.当威廉.金-摩根大通的证券产品的领袖还在卢旺达度假. one evening ceo jamie dimon to fire tracked him down to fire a red alert. 一天晚上首席执行官 占美.德孟找到了他并且向他发出了一个红色警报."billy, i really want you to watch out for subprime!"比利,我真的想让你当心次级贷款 dimon's voice crackled over king's hotel phone. 德孟的声音穿过金所在酒店的电话."we need to sell a lot of our positions. 我们需要出售很多我的们的阵地i've seen it before.我以前就经历过的 th** stuff could go up in smoke!这些东西会化为乌有的.that call marked the beginning of a remarkable strategic shift that helped j.p. morgan (jpm, fortune 500) sidestep the worst of a h**toric credit cr****.这通电话标志着摩根大通(财富 500)为回避历史上最大的**采取的出色的战略转换的开始 j.p. morgan mostly exited the business of securitizing subprime mortgages when it was booming.摩根大通在快速发展的时候退出了大部分的证券的次级贷款抵押的业务. with the notable exception of goldman sachs (gs, fortune 500), j.p. morgan's main compe**s - including citigroup (c, fortune 500), ubs (ubs), and merrill lynch (mer, fortune 500) - ignored the danger signs and piled into those products in a feeding frenzy.除了著名的高盛投资公司(财富 500),摩根大通的主要竞争对手包括了花旗集团(财富500)瑞士联合银行(注:现在也是财富500强)和美林(财富500) 都忽略了这个危险信号而疯狂的进入这些物业从而形成了大鱼吃小鱼的趋势(th** ** an excerpt from a story that ran in the sept. 15 **sue of fortune. for more on dimon and the team of talented lieutenants who helped j.p. morgan dodge the credit cr****, read the full story) (这是摘自9月15日财富发表的一个故事。欲了解更多有关该德孟和一支能干的副手如何协助摩根大通回避**，请阅读全文)make no m**take千万别搞错: j.p. morgan ** also suffering from the credit crunch.摩根大通也在忍受着**的冲击 while it largely dodged the subprime bullet,当时他们只是大部分的避开了次级贷款的袭击 j.p. morgan stumbled in two other areas摩根大通的错误在另外2个领域: : funding dubious deals in the lbo frenzy and jumping into the jumbo mortgage market when other banks were getting out. 在杠杆收购的狂潮中资金分配的犹豫不定和当其他银行退出时进入巨大的抵押市场.the third quarter ** already looking tough.在第三季度的时候已经开始经营困难. the company has announced that it ** taking $1.5 billion in mortgage and leveraged-loan write-downs, and another $600 million to account for the decline in the value of its fannie mae and freddie mac preferred stock.这个公司对外宣称在抵押和杠杆贷款资产减值上面获得了15亿美金,而另外的600百万美元去降低他在联邦国民抵押协会和联邦住房贷款抵押公司优先股的市值.still, j.p. morgan ** weathering the cr**** far better than its **. 但是摩根大通化解危机还是比其他竞争者有优势的.from july 2007,从2007年7月开始 when the cyclone began, 当这飓风开始的时候through the second quarter of th** year,到这年的第二个季度 j.p. morgan took just $5 billion in losses on high-r**k cdos and leveraged loans, compared with $33 billion at citi, $26 billion at merrill lynch, and $9 billion at bank of america (bac, fortune 500). 和花旗证券损失33亿美元,美林损失26亿美元,美国银行(财富 500强)损失9亿美元相比摩根大通只是在高风险的债务抵押债券和杠杆贷款中损失了5亿美元and in th** market, losing less means winning big.而且在这个市场中损失的少就意味着赢得的多.before the cr**** j.p. morgan was a middle-of-the-pack performer在这次危机之前摩根大通只是排在中间的运营者; today it leads in nearly every category, starting with its stock.今天他的通过股票已经领导几乎所有的业务 since early 2007,从2007年早期开始, its share price has dropped 24%, to $37(as of aug. 27), vs. declines of 44% for bank of america and 68% for citigroup.他的股票价格对比美国银行下降的44个百分点,和花旗集团下降的68个百分点 仅仅下降了24个百分点到37美元(8月27号的价格) last year its market cap was far below those of citi and bofa.去年他的总市值远远的落后在花旗和美国银行的后面 today j.p. morgan stands in a virtual tie with bofa for first place among u.s. banks, and it towers over citi.现在摩根大通和美国银行在美国的银行中并列第一而且超过了花旗.that ** largely thanks to j.p. morgan's dec**ion to shun subprime cdos - vehicles that sell bonds backed by pools of subprime mortgage-backed securities.这样的大的规模要感谢摩根大通的回避次债损失的决策--通过联合次级按揭证券而出售担保债券 j.p. morgan has long ranked among the biggest buyers of auto and credit card loans, which it turned into asset-backed securities.摩根大通一直是汽车和**贷款的最大买家之一. but even in 2005而且直到2005年, j.p. morgan remained a small player in the hottest business on wall street, securitizing mortgages.在华尔街中最热门的抵押贷款证券化中摩根大通还不过是个很小的玩家. dimon wanted to build a far bigger franch**e, chiefly by securitizing the loans made by the bank itself through its chase home lending div**ion. 德孟要建立一个巨大的特许经营(注:像是麦当劳似的经营模式)，由银行本身通过其银行房屋贷款部门来实现证券化贷款。by 2006,在2006年 j.p. morgan was growing substantially in securitizing mortgages and dabbling in subprime cdos, a business that was generating billions in fees for other wall street firms.摩根大通的增长主要在证券抵押贷款和涉足次级债务抵押债券上,而且为华尔街其他的公司产生了上亿美元的收入.but dimon soon began to see reasons to pull back.但是很快德孟就意识到需要撤离的原因. one red flag came from the mortgage servicing business, the branch that sends out statements, handles escrow, and collects payments on $800 billion in home loans, its own and others'. 这象征危险的旗帜是来自抵押贷款服务公司的,这个分行发出的声明,控制的契约和征收的800亿美元的家庭贷款的付款,其中包括他们旗下和其他公司的.during a regular monthly business review for the retail bank in october 2006, the chief of servicing said that late payments on subprime loans were r**ing at an alarming rate.在这份2006年10月份的一份很平常的零**每月总结中,服务部**指出在晚些时候,次级贷款的支付将会以惊人的速率增长. the data showed that loans originated by compe**s like first franklin and american home were performing three times worse than j.p. morgan's subprime mortgages. 数据表明这些贷款来自于竞争者像 第一富兰克林(属于美林集团)而且美**庭(american home 美国的月刊杂志)展现了3倍不如摩根大通的次级抵押贷款"we concluded that underwriting standards were deteriorating across the industry," says dimon.我们总结了已经恶化并影响了整个行业的贷款标准. 德孟说.steve black and bill winters, co-heads of the investment bank, were d**covering more reasons to be cautious.史蒂夫.布莱克和比尔.温特斯--投资银行的智囊团发现了更多需要谨慎的原因. cdos **sue a range of bonds, from supposedly safe aaa-rated ones with relatively low yields to lower-rated ones with higher yields.债务抵押债券这一系列的债券根据安全的aaa评级标准: 一个的低收益的公司债券到更低收益的公司债券要经过一个高收益的阶段 winters and black saw that hedge funds, insurance companies, and other customers were clamoring for the high-yielding cdo ** and were less interested in the other stuff.温特斯和布莱特发现了对冲基金,保险公司,和其他客户要求高收益公司债券的债务抵押债券合同而且对其他的东西没有兴趣 that meant banks like merrill and citi were forced to hold billions of dollars of the aaa ** on their books. 这意味着想美林和花旗这样的银行在账面上为了aaa合同要保持上亿美元的现金.what's wrong with that?这样有什么错误? doesn't an aaa rating mean the securities are safe?aaa评级不是意味着这些有价证券是安全的吗? not necessarily.并不一定.in 2006, aaa-rated cdo bonds yielded only two percentage points more than supersafe treasury bills. 在2006年,aaa评级的债务抵押债券的债券收益比相当安全的短期国库券高了2个百分点.so the market seemed to be saying that the bonds were solid.所以这好像是在表明市场的债券是稳定的. but black and winters concluded otherw**e.但是布莱特和温斯特的结论是不同的. their yardstick was credit default swaps - insurance against bond failures.他们的衡量标准是信用违约互换--保险债券**债券的失败 by late 2006 the cost of default swaps on subprime cdos had jumped sharply. 在2006年后期,对于次级贷款的债务抵押债券的违约互换的成本开始急速增长.winters and black saw that once they bought credit default swaps to hedge the aaa cdo ** j.p. morgan would h**e to hold, the fees from creating cdos would van**h. 温斯特和布莱特意识到一旦他们买入信用违约互换去保护aaa的债务抵押债券合同摩根大通将要必须要撑住,而创造抵押债券的利润将会消失."we saw no profit, and lots of r**k, in holding subprime ** on our balance sheet,"我意识到在资产负债表中保持次级贷款是没有利润反而有很多的风险. says winters.温斯特说. the combined weight of that data triggered dimon's call to king in africa.这些数据组合以后导致德孟打电话给在非洲的金. "it was jamie who saw all the pieces,"这是占美意识到这所有的碎片 says winters.温斯特说.in late 2006, j.p. morgan started slashing its holdings of subprime debt.在2006年后期摩根大通开始削减其持有的次级债券的债务。 it sold more than $12 billion in subprime mortgages that it had originated.大通售出了曾经产生过12亿美元的次级债券抵押. its trading desks dumped the loans on their books and mostly stopped making markets in subprime ** for customers.他的这些出售的交易在账面上降低了贷款金额,而且停止了对大部分顾客提供次级贷款业务. j.p. morgan's corporate treasury under ina drew even starting hedging, betting that credit spreads would widen. 摩根大通的公司债券在ina drew(没查到)之下甚至开始套期保值并且押注在债券差价将会扩大.over the next year those hedges reportedly yielded gains of hundreds of millions of dollars.第二年, 根据报道这些回避政策的收益达到上亿美元.dimon's stance was radical德孟的观点是激进的: he was skirting the biggest growth business on wall street.他绕开了在华尔街上增长最大的业务. j.p. morgan sank from third to sixth in fixed-income underwriting from 2005 to 2007, and the main reason was its refusal to play in subprime cdos, which its ** were gorging on.在2005到2007年间摩根大通的保险业的固定收入从第三下降到第六,而主要的原因就是他们拒绝加入他们竞争对手在进行的次级贷款的债务抵押债券交易, "we'd get the quarterly reports from our compe**s and see that they'd added $100 billion to their balance sheets,我们有我们竞争对手的季度报表,而且发现在他们的资产负债表上加入了100亿美元" says dimon.德孟说. "and they were hardly adding any capital, so it looked like their investments were almost r**k-free.而且他们几乎没有加入任何的资金,所以看起来他们的投资是几乎没有风险的." but in the end, of course, the dec**ion to shun subprime made dimon a hero.但是最后,当然这回避次级贷款的决策让德孟成为了一个英雄.终于翻译完了,好累. 20210311